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Introduction
On January 1, 1999, most European Union (EU) Member States entered
the first phase of monetary union.1 Monetary union promises to stir com-
petition and reduce the costs of transacting business in Member States
across Europe.2 However, monetary union also poses potential problems,
* J.D. Candidate, Cornell Law School, 2000; A.B., Stanford University, 1996.
Research Assistant, Hoover Institution, 1996-97.
1. Sweden, Denmark, the United Kingdom and Greece (hereinafter "derogation
states") have not yet joined monetary union. See OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, YOUR BUSINESS mD THE EURO: A STRATEGIC GUIDE 12
(1999). Greece has expressed its desire to join by January 1, 2001. See id.
2. See generally DIRECTORAT GENEAu. XV oF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Accour-
ING FOR THE INTRoDUc-noN OF THE EURO (1997). For example, from January 1, 1999,
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particularly with respect to controlling the money supply among Member
States. Politicians in Member States have incentives to attempt to increase
the money supply to their respective countries to help relieve economic
recession 3 and to satisfy personal political goals.4 Only two months after
monetary union, Germany's finance minister, Oskar Lafontaine, pressed
the European Central Bank (ECB) to cut interest rates5 to increase the
money supply, because German interest rates were 0.5 to 1 percent higher
than euro-zone rates.6 The ECB refused to cut rates, 7 and the president of
the ECB, Wim Duisenberg, blamed the weakness of the euro on pressure
from politicians like Lafontaine.8 Nor is Germany an anomaly: social dem-
ocratic governments with similar priorities are now in power in nine out of
the elevenparticipating Member States.9
This Note examines the possibilities for Member Sthtes like Germany
to attempt to expand their money supply. As the German case indicates,
there is a substantial probability that politicians in Member States will
attempt to pursue fiscal or monetary expansion to bolster their own econo-
mies. According to its current position, the ECB claims responsibility for
price stability and dismisses responsibility for unemployment or for fine
tuning aggregate demand. 10 Governments have reacted disfavorably to this
position. According to Duisenberg, after two months of monetary union,
both the ECB and the European Commission feared that France and Ger-
many would break principal commitments against government spend-
businesses may invoice in euros, hold a bank account in euros, make electronic pay-
ments in euros and, in most participating Member States, file tax and social security
returns in euros. See YOUR BusiNEss AND THE EURO, supra note 1, at 9.
3. See generally Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on "Employment
Policy and the Role of Socio-economic Organizations in the Third Phase of Economic
and Monetary Union," 1.3.2.2 and 5.4, 1999 OJ. (C 40) 12 (1998) (stating "if Member
States fail to coordinate economic policies adequately, the single currency may well turn
out to be an enormous disappointment" and that socio-economic organizations can
cause inflationary pressures). Adjustment of the money supply to counter recessions
(i.e., counter-cyclical policy) is termed "monetary policy" by economists. See JOSEPH E.
STIGLiTZ, EcONOMics 681 (1993).
4. Cf. Geoffrey P. Miller, An Interest-Group Theory of Central Bank Independence, 27
J. LEGAL STUD. 433 (1998) (analyzing, in the context of the U.S. political economy, the
methods used by politicians to extract funds from interest groups).
5. See The Euro: Neurosis, ECONOMIST, Feb. 27, 1999, at 73 [hereinafter Neurosis].
6. See Wolfgang Manchau, ECB Faces Conflicting Signals From Euro-Zone, FIN. TIMES,
Mar. 9, 1999, at 2.
7. See .CB Keeps Rates on Hold as Euro Hits New Lows, AGENCE FRANCE PRESs, Mar.
4, 1999, at financial pages 1.
8. See Neurosis, supra note 5, at 73 ("Wim Duisenberg, the President of the Euro-
pean Central Bank, also blames the euro's weakness on politicians - most notably
Oskar Lafontaine...').
9. See Worst of Both Worlds: Conflicts Between Central Bankers and Politicians Could
Leave the Euro-Zone with Complete Policy Paralysis, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1999, at 24 (stat-
ing "the social democratic governments ... are in power in all but two of the euro-zone's
member states").
10. See id. Price stability is defined as keeping inflation between zero and two per-
cent in the medium term. See id.
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ing. 11 Such government spending by Member States, as well as monetary
policy tools, can expand the money supply, effect price stability, and even
threaten monetary union.12 The Treaty on European Union (EC Treaty or
Maastricht), 13 which established the ECB and European System of Central
Banks (ESCB), was designed to impose commitments on Member States
against monetary expansion. 14 But Member States have begun challenging
the credibility of their commitments.
Law and economics, along with transaction costs economics, provides
a theory to evaluate whether current Maastricht regulations provide a
framework for credible commitments by Member States against monetary
expansion- 5 This Note argues that the theory of credible commitments 16
reveals current deficiencies in Member States' commitment against mone-
tary expansion. However, a comprehensive negative assessment is prema-
ture because additional rules may provide necessary commitments. This
Note suggests that legal rulings by European Community (EC) courts and
agencies, in common law fashion, can interpret broadly-drafted legal duties
in order to fill the current gaps in Maastricht commitments.
Part I of this Note explains that governments will manipulate the
money supply as a default rule and summarizes a Member State's rational
incentives to try to expand the money supply. This section also provides
background on the methods that central banks (and the ECB) use to
manipulate the money supply, and the reasons this poses a problem under
11. See ECB Keeps Rates on Hold As Euro Hits New Lows, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Mar.
9, 1999, at financial pages 1 (quoting Wim Duisenberg as saying "we share, with the
European Commission, the concern over the determination, particularly of the large
countries to adhere to the aims of the stability and growth pact," and defining the large
countries as France and Germany.) The Stability and Growth Pact promulgates terms
for euro zone countries to bring their budgets close to balance or even into surplus in the
medium term. The Pact was finalized at the Amsterdam European Council in 1997 and
has the force of law. See Patrick R. Hugg, Transnational Convergence: European Union
and American Federalism, 32 CORNELL INT'L .J. 43, 56 (1998); see also INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, Oct. 1997, at 58.
12. See, e.g., Peter B. Kenen, The Transition to EMU: Issues and Implications, 4
COLUM. J. Eut. L. 359 (1998) (stating "monetary union... can amplify differences in
real economic conditions when its members experience different shocks and there is
insufficient wage flexibility or labor mobility in the union.")
13. See TREATY EsTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, Oj. (C 224) 1
(1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) (available at <http://www.europe.eu.int/eur-lex/
en/treaties/index.html>) [hereinafter EC TREATY].
14. See generally COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION,
REPORT ON ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1989) [herein-
after Delors Report]. See also CARLos JAviER MOREiRO GONZALEZ, BANKING IN EUROPE
AFTER 1992, at 80 (1993) ("[Tlhe legitimate concern of all Central Banks... is to assure
the monetary authorities, called upon to manage a Federal European Bank [the ECB], a
sufficient degree of independence vis a vis political authorities, which are always sus-
pected of inflationary laxity regarding the financing of internal deficits through money
creation."). In this Note, "monetary expansion" refers to expansion of a Member States'
money supply by either fiscal or monetary policy.
15. See infra Part 11; see generally Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political
Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development, 11 J.L. ECON &
ORG. 1 (1995) (discussing applications of the theory of credible commitments).
16. See infra Part II.
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monetary union. Part II presents an overview of the theory of credible
commitments. Part III analyzes how the legal framework of monetary
union fails to induce Member States to credibly commit against monetary
expansion. Currently, outside enforcement mechanisms are too weak to
raise the costs of monetary expansion above the associated benefits. Also,
the current legal structure allows Member States to circumvent prohibi-
tions and externalize the costs of monetary expansion, which prevents
their commitments from being self-enforcing. Part IV summarizes pos-
sibilities to create credibility by filling gaps in commitments through
imposing broad legal duties. The Note concludes that, without modifica-
tion, the present structure fails to create a credible commitment against
monetary expansion.
I. Incentives to Change the Money Supply and Methods Used by
Central Banks
A. Incentives to Change the Money Supply
In the absence of a comprehensive legal framework, politicians in Member
States have tremendous incentives to manipulate the money supply. 17
Manipulating the supply of money in an economy can effect economic
growth and welfare.' 8 For example, changing the supply of money in the
economy can avert or remedy a recession.1 9 If the central bank suddenly
pumps more money into the economy, people will have more money to
spend. When consumers spend more money, they create more jobs. Thus,
more money translates to higher employment and subdues the recession.20
However, monetary expansion can create problems, such as infla-
tion,21 which means a reduction (or dilution) in the value of each unit of
17. See CHRISTOS HADJIEMMANUIL, THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK AND BANKING SUPERVI.
SION 11, n. 24 (Joseph J. Norton ed., The London Institute of International Banking,
Finance & Development Law) (1996) (stating that even in regard to European monetary
union, "political decision-makers in governments and parliaments are likely to abandon
their professional commitment to price stability [because] the structure of their incen-
tives is such that their economic policies will probably be influenced much less by long
term considerations of sound money than by the desire to finance public spending and
to manipulate monetary conditions for the purpose of achieving short-term economic
growth, in order to procure political benefits and alleviate electoral pressures").
18. See STIGLITZ, supra note 3, at 982 (presenting, in a general textbook on econom-
ics, the monetarists' approach to formulaic control of the money supply contrasted with
the new Keynesian approach, which advocates additional use of discretionary monetary
policies). See also ANTHONY SAUNDERS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS MANAGEMENT 86 (1994)
("[U]nderlying the movement of interest rates is the strategy of the central bank or the
Federal Reserve.").
19. See Miller, supra note 4, at 442-44. See also STIGLITz, supra note 3, at 915 and
922 (discussing Keynesian monetary theory and alternative ways that monetary policy
works).
20. See STIGLITZ, supra note 3, at 976-77 (discussing basic economic principles of
inflation) and SAUNDERS, supra note 18, at 86-97 (providing a financial model to measure
risk to banks arising from adjustment of interest rates).
21. See STIGLITZ, supra note 3, at 977 (discussing the Phillips curve). See also
Michael J. Arids & Zenon G. Kontolemis, Inflation Targeting and the European Central
Vol. 33
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money.22 Inflation imposes real costs on society. It distorts economic
activity, forces people to reprice their real assets according to the changing
(nominal) price level, and forces lenders to take costly efforts to avoid los-
ing the value of their financial claims. Inflation also reduces the purchas-
ing power of workers or beneficiaries on fixed incomes.23
Nevertheless, politicians often find that increasing the money supply
(particularly before elections) works to their advantage. 24 Increasing the
money supply creates short-term gains in the form of new jobs, while the
long-term costs of inflation are slow to appear.25 Politicians prefer to cre-
ate new jobs quickly, but they want to be viewed as crusaders against infla-
tion, not conspirators to cause inflation. 26 Incumbents may pressure the
central bank to expand the money supply shortly before elections to help
ensure that constituents are employed at election time.27 After their re-
election, they then can tackle any resulting inflation.28 Changing the
money supply thereby helps politicians' re-election campaigns. Politicians
also may extract money from interest groups by promoting or merely
threatening inflationary practices. 29
In addition to purely political motives, politicians also have govern-
ment interest motives for expanding the money supply. Expanding the
money supply can help the government gain revenue, reduce its debt, and
lower its trade deficit. If a government suddenly issues money to itself by
borrowing from the central bank,30 the government gains revenue and
reaps all the benefits of monetary expansion. Yet, the ensuing inflation
Bank, ECO No. 98/4 at 2 (1998) (predicting and assessing a model for varying levels of
inflation among Member States).
22. An analogy can be made to cutting a pie. The total pie represents the gross
domestic product (overall domestic earnings) of an economy, and each slice of the pie
symbolizes each unit of money in the economy. As the number of slices increases - i.e.,
as the supply/amount of money increases - each slice becomes proportionately nar-
rower. Thus, if the size of the pie remains the same, each slice becomes narrower, and
each unit of money correspondingly loses value. The phenomenon of reducing the size
of the piece of the economy's productivity, measured by its money, or currency unit of
account, is called inflation.
23. See STIGLITZ, supra note 3, at 653 (discussing basic principles of inflation).
24. See Miller, supra note 4, at 442 and HAJIEMMANUIL, supra note 17, at 11 n. 24.
25. See STIGLITZ, supra note 3, at 977.
26. See Miller, supra note 4, at 443. See also JoAo LouE.Ro, MONErARY PoucY IN TiE
EUROPEAN MONETARY SysTEm 69-70 (1996) (presenting a game theory model for political
decisionmaking about inflation in the EU).
27. See Kenen, supra note 12, at 359.
28. See LouaniRo, supra note 26, at 70 (stating that politicians have "the incentive to
create surprise inflation"). See also HAxJi mMANUIL, supra note 17, at 11 n. 24.
29. See Miller, supra note 4 at 438 (arguing that in the absence of institutional com-
mitments against monetary expansion, politicians will seek to implement legislation
that affects the money supply solely in order to make deals with the interest groups that
would bear costs from such legislation).
30. As with politically-motivated expansion, the expenditure of central bank funds
must be done in an unanticipated manner. Otherwise, according to the rational expec-
tations theory of economics, the public will either hold less real money according to
inflationary risk, or build inflationary buffers into private contracts. This would pro-
duce a net overall equal effect on employment. See STIGLITZ, supra note 3, at 849-51 and
980-81.
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implicitly taxes the public by diluting the money.31 Likewise, if a govern-
ment's debt is denominated in its currency, inflation devalues the currency
and thus reduces the government's overall debt. Under certain conditions,
countries can also reduce their trade deficit (balance of payments deficit3 2)
and increase employment and output by creating inflation.3 3 For example,
if a small country has labor unions that demand wages at a price in excess
of the optimal price (market clearing price), inflation can reduce the price
of wages and lead to increased employment.3 4
Although any government has strong incentives to manipulate the
money supply, governments (or their national central banks) in a common
currency area such as the EU have even greater incentives. 35 In particular,
governments can benefit from a collective action problem.36 A collective
action or "tragedy of the commons" 3 7 problem arises when a group agrees
to refrain from a particular activity that, while individually beneficial,
would harm the group as a whole. If all members uphold their commit-
ment to not engage in the prohibited activity, (i.e., forego individual prof-
its) the entire group benefits. However, members will have an incentive to
violate their commitments where all the benefits arising from violation
flow to the breaching member, while the entire group shares the associated
costs. 38 Because the euro-currency area extends across eleven countries,
the politicians of one Member State may spread the costs of inflation
resulting from monetary expansion across all eleven countries, while local-
izing the benefits in their own country. Localization of benefits may be
possible through Member State spending programs (fiscal policy) or by
using the tools discussed in the following section.39
Consequently, in addition to incentives from anti-recessionary public
policy, political self-interest, and governmental fiscal interests, politicians
in monetary union have collective action incentives to expand their
31. See Kenen, supra note 12, at 359.
32. See Miller, supra note 4, at 439.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See MICHAEL EMERSON ET AL., ONE MARKET, ONE MONEY: AN EVALUATION OF THE
POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FORMING AN ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION 44
(1990).
36. For the classic text on collective action problems, see generally MANcUR OLsoN,
THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY of GROUPS (1971).
37. The "tragedy of the commons" problem often occurs in intergovernmental agree-
ments involving ocean fisheries. For example, to prevent overfishing of the Grand
Banks, all fishermen have a common interest in limiting their total harvest to what the
fishery will support. However, each fisherman also has an incentive to maximize his
immediate gain by taking out more fish. By doing so, the fisherman gains all the benefit
of overharvesting (i.e., greater short-term profits), while the long-term costs of a depleted
fishery are borne in common by all fishermen. See KENT BLADES, NET DESTRUCTION: THE
DEATH OF ALANTcC CANADA'S FISHERY 4, 9-10 (1995).
38. See OLSON, supra note 36, at 40.
39. See Part I, Section B, infra; see also Ross Cranston, Banking and Investment Serv-
ices: Implications of the New Financial Landscape, in EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETs: THE
INvEsTMENT SERVICES DIREcTwVE AND BEYOND 45, 59 (Guido Ferrarini, ed., 1998) (arguing
localized benefits can also occur by invoking emergency grants or lump-sum transfers of
money from the European Union).
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nation's money supply. Politicians also have incentives to change the
money supply to fortify the economy against recession, both for their own
self-interest and for the government's fiscal interest. Thus, without legal
commitments against government intervention, Member State govern-
ments can be expected to manipulate the money supply as a default rule.
B. Methods Used by Central Banks To Change the Money Supply
The foregoing section described the reasons for a government to manipu-
late the money supply; this section describes the corresponding methods.
National central banks (NCBs) of Member States and the ECB can manipu-
late the money supply using market operations and regulatory devices.40
Market operations include open market operations, 4 1 adjusting the dis-
count rate, and granting credits to standing lending facilities. 42 Regulatory
devices include changing the reserve requirements on standing lending
institutions.4 3
Both the ECB and the NCBs can perform open market operations.44
This is done by selling debt instruments - mainly government bonds - on
a financial exchange.45 If an NCB or the ECB sells bonds, it reduces the
money supply by the amount paid for the bonds on the exchange. If the
bank buys bonds, it expands the money supply by the amount that the
bank pays investors for these bonds.4 6 The EC Treaty expressly provides
each NCB (as well as the ECB) with the power to conduct open market
operations.4 7 This includes sophisticated types of market operations. 48
40. See LuKAs MENKOi', MONETARY POLICY INSTRUMENTS FOR EUROPEAN MONETARY
UNION 8, 20-21 (1997) (arguing that open market operations will form the backbone of
monetary policy and minimum reserve policy, (regulatory devices) will be more
prevalent).
41. See infra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
42. See id. See also PETER B. KENN, ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION IN EUROPE:
MOVING BEYOND MAAsTRCHT 44, 55 (1995) (presenting an overview of the process and
some potential dilemmas in open market operations under Maastricht).
43. See MENKHoFF, supra note 40, at 20.
44. See Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the
European Central Bank art. 18.2 [hereinafter ESCB Statute] in RALPH MmiNERT-Me.N,
CENTRAL BANK To THE EUROPEAN UNION 128 (1995). The ESCB Statute is annexed to the
EC Treaty under Article 106(4). See EC Treaty, supra note 13, art. 106(4). See also
KENEN, supra note 42, at 64 (presenting three models for open market operations under
monetary union).
45. SeeJoNATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAWV AND REGULATION 15
(2d ed. 1997)
46. See STIGLn'Z, supra note 3, at 255-56 and 901 (defining bonds and describing
their use in monetary policy).
47. See ESCB Statute, supra note 44, art. 18.2. See also KmnE, supra note 42, at 38
(outlining the powers of the ECB and NCBs).
48. See REN SMiTs, THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK: INSTITUTIONAL ASPEcrs 227-28
(1997) (outlining sophisticated market instruments). Both the ECB and the NCBs can
engage in repurchase agreements and spot and forward transactions (buying and selling
"outright") by lending or borrowing claims and marketable instruments, whether in EU
or non-EU currencies, or precious metals. See ESCB Statute, supra note 44, art. 18.1.
Under repurchase (repo) agreements, a central bank can buy an asset from the market,
while agreeing to sell it back after certain period. This sellback reduces the money sup-
ply, but keeps collateral to hedge possible losses in the deal. Central banks may also
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Three structural features, distinguishing the European System of Cen-
tral Banks (ESCB) from the U.S. Federal Reserve system, may provide
incentives for Member States to expand the money supply through open
market operations. First, unlike the Federal Reserve (Fed) which has
branches only in regions, 49 the ESCB has NCBs in each Member State.50
This proximity may increase the NCBs' vulnerability to Member State polit-
ical pressure and is equivalent to a Fed branch in every state of the United
States. Second, almost every Member State in the EU has an autonomous
financial exchange. 5' Exchanges in each Member State may allow mone-
tary expansion to be localized geographically. In contrast, individual
states in the United States do not possess their own financial exchanges.
Third, whereas the Fed tightly regulates branch credit operations,52 the
ECB currently has looser statutory control over the NCBs. The ECB is lim-
ited to promulgating "general principles" for open market and credit opera-
tions both for itself and the NCBs.53 These principles include the
announcement of conditions under which the ECB and NCBs "stand ready
to enter" into open market and credit operations.5 4 Neither the ECB nor
other EC institutions have yet defined the scope of these general
principles. 55
In addition to open market operations, both the NCBs and the ECB
can adjust the money supply through its credit with standing lending facili-
ties, such as credit institutions and other market participants.5 6 If an NCB
or the ECB lowers its interest rate to standing lending facilities or banks
lend with securities as collateral, or borrow against a pledge of securities, producing
similar effects. This may involve the security (or foreign exchange) being delivered
immediately (spot transactions) or at a later date (forward transactions). Buy/sell back
transactions, another market instrument, determine the sale and repurchase simultane-
ously, but from two separate agreements that function like repurchase agreements. See
SMrrs, supra, at 228. The repurchase expands the money supply. See also MuNuoi'F,
supra note 40, at 19 (highlighting the importance of repurchase transactions).
49. See MARJORIE DEANE & ROBERT PRINGLE, THE CENTRAL BANKS 216 (1995).
50. See MEHNERT-MELAND, supra note 44, at 77; Rob Dixon, BANKING IN EUROPE: THE
SINGLE MARKET 113 (1993).
51. See Cranston, supra note 39, at 62.
52. See DEANE & PRINGLE, supra note 49, at 216 and 218. See also KENEN, supra note
42, at 66 (arguing that the United States employs a tightly centralized model of control
of the Fed branches).
53. ESCB Statute, supra note 44, art. 18.2.
54. Id.
55. According to Maastricht statutes regulating reserve requirements, the ESCB
seems to envision a limitation on open market operations by limiting the amount of
reserves or access to reserves by the NCBs. This assumes that existing reserves would
be insufficient for a monetary expansion and that the NCBs cannot channel non-ESCB
transactions to aid this monetary expansion. See, e.g., Age F. P. Bakker & Guido F. T.
Wolswijk, Some Thoughts on the Monetary Framework in EMU, in EUROPEAN MONETARY
UNION: THE WAY FORWARD 86 (H.M. Scobie ed., 19§8). But see MENKIoPF, supra note
40, at 20 (arguing that minimum reserve policy has been losing ground and is no longer
considered a common instrument of monetary policy). If Menkhoff is correct, then the
reserve policy is more of a disciplinary device on NCBs, rather than a tool for monetary
policy.
56. See ESCB Statute, supra note 44, art. 18.2. See also KENEN, supra note 42, at 38
(describing ESCB transactions with credit institutions).
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(e.g., its discount rate), these banks will borrow more money from the cen-
tral bank and make more loans, thereby increasing the money supply. Any
lending to credit institutions must be based on adequate collateral.5 7
The NCBs and the ECB also can change the money supply through
regulatory devices.58 These include changing the reserve requirements in
standing lending facilities.59 Lowering the reserve requirement increases
the amount of money that banks or credit institutions can loan, which in
turn increases the money supply. In addition, the Governing Council,60
the primary decision-making body of the ESCB, can grant additional opera-
tional methods to effect the money supply.61
C. A Possible Legal Solution To Incentives To Manipulate the Money
Supply
Legal provisions can provide Member States with incentives to keep their
commitment against monetary expansion, notwithstanding the over-
whelming political incentives to manipulate the money supply.62 To clarify
the implications of such a legal solution, the following section presents an
analytical model to distinguish between the legal commitment itself, and
the legal provisions that enforce this commitment. This analytical model is
well-established and is termed the theory of credible commitments.
II. Overview of the Theory of Credible Commitments
The prior section analyzed the political incentives for a Member State to
expand the money supply and the methods for central banks to expand the
money supply. This section presents a theoretical background for evaluat-
ing government commitments against monetary expansion.
While originating in economics, the theory of credible commitments 63
can explain dilemmas pertaining to the enforceability of contracts, such as
the EU's agreement against monetary expansion.64 Before forming a con-
tract, bargaining parties attempt to anticipate compliance problems that
may arise after the contract is formed. If either party has complete author-
57. See KENEN, supra note 42, at 38.
58. See SnGLT'z, supra note 3, at 900-01 (discussing regulatory devices as monetary
policy) and MENIsoFF, supra note 40, at 21 (discussing regulatory devices as applied to
the ESCB).
59. See MaNut T-MEiAm, supra note 44, at 79.
60. See infra note 106.
61. See ESCB Statute, supra note 44, art. 20. This requires a two-thirds majority vote
of the Governing Council. See id.
62. See infra Part III.
63. See OLIVER WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 48-49 (1985)
(noting that when ex post problems are anticipated ex ante, parties devise institutions to
attempt to alter incentives to generate compliance with the bargain after contracting,
stating "[r]ather than reply to opportunism in kind, the wise (bargaining party] is one
who seeks both to give and receive 'credible commitments.'").
64. See GEORGE A. BmANN, ROGERJ. GOEBEL, WLLIAMJ. DAVEY AND ELEANOR M. Fox,
CASES AND MATEIUALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 22-26 (1993) (describing European
integration, including European Monetary Union, as a set of treaties between con-
tracting parties).
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ity to breach the contract at will, or if no conclusive enforcement mecha-
nism exists against both parties, then no "credible commitment" exists.65
Much of the theory of credible commitments originates in economics.
Ronald Coase, a Nobel laureate in economics and a founder of law and
economics theory at the University of Chicago, theorized that where trans-
action costs were zero and perfect information existed, exchanges would
continue until no additional exchange could make a person better off with-
out making someone else worse off.66 Douglass C. North,67 another Nobel
laureate in economics, applied Coase's esoteric theory to demonstrate that
economic growth can more easily be explained by studying reductions in
transaction costs than by analyzing the traditional economic factors of pro-
duction - land, labor and capital inputs. 68 North argued that reductions
in transaction costs occurred through the imposition of rules or normative
structures called "institutions," which establish formal or informal con-
straints on human behavior.69 Consequently, such institutions not only
can correct market imperfections, but also are necessary to improve eco-
nomic performance in the real world, where transaction costs are
positive.70
The theory of credible commitments identifies rules, enforcement
mechanisms, or norms of behavior that "disable or render Costly"7 1 the use
of discretionary power by a sovereign. 72 Two types of rules or norms
achieve this effect and thus establish credible commitments to interna-
tional agreements. First, an outside enforcement agency, such as the Euro-
pean Commission or the courts, can raise the penalties for breach of
65. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 63, at 49.
66. See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, J. LAW & EcON. 1, 4 (1960). Pro-
fessor Coase won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1991.
67. See DOUGLAsS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PER-
FORMANCE 4 (1990).
68. See id.; see generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH & ROBERT P. THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE
WESTERN WORLD: A NEW ECONOMIC HISTORY (1973); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, STRUCTURE
AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY (1981). Professor North won the Nobel Prize in Eco-
nomics in 1993 for his contribution on economic structures.
69. See NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE,
supra note 65, at 4 (stating that institutions can be "formal constraints - such as rules
that human beings devise - and [also] informal constraints - such as conventions and
codes of behavior. Institutions may be created, as was the United States Constitution; or
they may simply evolve over time, as does the common law.").
70. See id. at 5-6 (stating that "[i]nstitutions affect the performance of the economy
by their effect on the costs of exchange and production. Together with the technology
employed, they determine the transaction and transformation (production) costs that
make up total costs."). See generally NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HIS-
TORY, supra note 66.
71. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Discretion, Institutions, and the Problem of Government Com-
mitment, in SOCIAL THEORY FOR A CHANGING SOCIETY 245, 250 (Pierre Bourdieu & James
Coleman eds., 1991) ("Getting property rights right.., involves not only... specifying
rights and enforcing them, but it also means arranging political institutions so as to
disable or render costly the exercise of discretionary authority.").
72. For purposes of this Note, a "sovereign" means a political entity that defines
substantial rights within its jurisdiction. In the context of monetary union, "use"
denotes a Member State's use of euros for its own benefit that effects the property value
of the euro for all Member States.
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international agreements above the benefits the government would receive
from its breach.73 Second, if an outside enforcement agency does not exist
or is ineffective, self-enforcement mechanisms can establish a credible
commitment if compliance with the agreement is in the sovereign's inter-
ests. 74 This can occur if the government constrains its own ability to act by
establishing a self-created institution or legal structure whose existence
raises the costs of breaching the agreement above the costs of maintaining
the agreement. In effect, such institutions or legal structures force the gov-
ernment to internalize the costs of breaching the agreements; if these costs
are high enough, breach is no longer an attractive option. Thus, to deter-
mine whether the institutions and legal structures of monetary union are
credible commitments, an analysis must examine (1) whether outside
enforcement creates penalties that exceed benefits for breach, (2) whether a
self-created legal structure forces governments to internalize the costs of
breaching the agreement, and (3) whether these costs exceed the costs for
maintaining the agreement.
The concept of an outside enforcement mechanism (such as an over-
seeing court) is easy to understand, but the concept of a self-created insti-
tution or legal structure is more difficult. European history provides the
best examples of self-created institutions,75 particularly institutions that
force sovereigns with direct loans to keep their debtor-creditor agreements.
73. The analysis is actually more complex. The enforcement agency must raise both
(1) the costs and probability of enforcement plus (2) the benefits of keeping the agree-
ment (times the probability that it will be kept), above the costs for (1) maintaining the
agreement (times the probability that costs will occur) plus (2) the benefits of breach
(times the probability of reaping these benefits). Uncertainty variables and irrationality
variables could be added. To add additional layers of complexity, these calculations may
not be only economic but also political. In addition, they do not involve the citizenry in
the abstract but rather representative decision-makers who may have a dissimilar set of
cost and benefit preferences than their constituents. The preferences of the gatekeepers
to these decision-makers are particularly decisive because they decide when, under what
circumstances, and with what options the decision makers will decide. See ERIC RAS-
MUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 67-121 (1994) (dis-
cussing parallel decision frameworks with complete and incomplete information). In
this Note, I assume that the former end of the equation will not exceed the later end of
the equation, at some point in time for some sovereign (Member State). Consequently, a
Member State will desire change or wish to withdraw or seek amelioration for its plight.
74. See generally Weingast, supra note 15, at 2 (stating "the central component of a
credible committment to a limited government is that these limits be self-enforcing").
75. See, e.g., HILTON ROOT, THE FOUNTAIN OF PRIVILEGE: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION
AN SOCIAL CHANGE IN OLD REGIME FRANCE AND ENGLAND (1994) (comparing credible
commitments in old regime France and England); see also Douglass C. North & Barry R.
Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: Evolution of Institutions Governing Public
Choice in 17th Cent. England, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 803, 817 (1989) (arguing that after Eng-
land's Glorious Revolution of 1688 laws of Parliament and other circumstances forced
the Crown to keep its agreements, and prevented Parliament from breaking agreements
like the Crown did, allowing the government to uphold property rights, as verified by
evidence from capital markets); Avner Greif et al., Coordination, Commitment, and
Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild, 102J. POL. ECON. 745 (1994) (arguing that
in the absence of an effective international legal system of contract enforcement, certain
merchant guilds forced governments to perform their contracts by credibly threatening
merchant embargos).
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Historically, kings of England and France each had difficulty raising reve-
nue by obtaining loans from their nobility, due to the Crown's inability to
make a credible repayment commitment. A king in arrears could reduce
the value of the "unit of account" for his debts by imprisoning his credi-
tor,7 6 canceling his loan agreements, or devaluing the "currency. '7 7 Lend-
ers in both countries recognized that the Crown's commitment to repay its
debts were not credible and avoided providing capital. 78
England finally established a self-enforcing credible commitment to
repay the Crown's debts in the 17th century. In post-Revolution England,
Parliament assumed the power to audit and veto government expendi-
tures.79 The Crown's agreement with Parliament became self-enforcing
because the changes resulted in greater commerce8 0 and generated revenue
for the Crown. The English Crown thus had no incentive to violate this
legal regime.
In contrast, France failed to establish self-enforcing commitments dur-
ing the 17th and 18th centuries.8 1 In the 18th century, royal creditors tried
to make the king face greater costs default by organizing individual finan-
ciers into corporate groups. These groups included the Farmers General,
the offices of the financiers (secr~taires du roi),82 and the Facult de
Droit8 3). The king's commitments to the corporations seemed credible
because the corporations promised lower interest rates if no default
76. See F.W. MAI.TAND, CONSrTtrnONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 298-301 (1908) (stat-
ing that the Star Chamber's equity rulings were considered an egregious exercise of arbi-
trary power); see also NORTH & WEINGAST, supra note 75, at 813 (arguing that such
rulings reduced credible commitments). The firing of ChiefJustice Coke (1616-17) and
Crew (1627) and the Chief Baron of the Exchequer, Walter, also illustrate the erosion of
credible commitments. See id.
77. The French monarchy commonly employed currency reform to cancel its debts,
Coinage (louis) was denominated in livre, the unit of account. By allowing the value of
the livre to decline, the Crown reduced some of its debt. See JOHN RILEY, THE SEVEN YEARS
WAR AND THE OLD REGIME OF FRANCE 167 (1986); see also Hilton L. Root, Tying the King's
Hand: Credible Commitments and Royal Fiscal Policy During the Old Regime, in 9 RATION-
ALrTY AND SociEry 240, 246 (1989) (noting that "between 1689 and 1726 the equivalent
of the livre in grams of silver declined from 8.33 grams to under 4.45 grams").
78. Lenders adopted several protective measures, including concealing assets from
the king; refraining from transparent business ventures or obtaining crown approval;
attempting to create credibility by person relationships with the king; and obtaining
compensation through non-cash benefits. See RooT, supra note 75, at 47-48.
79. These post-Revolutionary reforms stripped the Crown of its unilateral authority
to disband Parliament and gave Parliament exclusive authority to raise new taxes, audit
government expenditures, veto expenditures, and monitor placement of funds. See
NORTH & WEINGAST, supra note 75, at 829-31 (also noting that post-Revolutionary polit-
ical reforms limited the King's ability to cancel debt).
80. Lenders became more willirig to finance enterprises in the wake of these reforms
because they experienced lower risk that a demonstration of wealth would induce the
sovereign to force loans. See id. at 817.
81. See RooT, supra note 75, at 248.
82. Those who bought a secrdtaire were paid salaries (gages) and had privileges.
However, these benefits could be revoked if office-holders failed to meet the Crown's
requests for capital. See ROOT, supra note 75, at 29.
83. See id. at 247-49.
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occurred.84 The king, however, could opportunistically breach commit-
ments with different corporate groups, because he could default and exter-
nalize his costs on one corporate group, while simultaneously receiving
new funds from another group.8 5 The legal structure did not force the king
to keep all his agreements - and thereby internalize all his costs - as
Parliament required of the English kings.8 6 Thus, although French kings
honored some of the commitments they made with corporate groups, these
commitments were not self-enforcing.
U.S. history also provides examples of credible commitments for cen-
tral banks. For example, the Federal Reserve Bank's (Fed) independence
from Congress is a legal custom rather than a legal requirement.8 7 Theo-
retically, Congress could attempt to dictate the policies of the Fed by
threatening to repeal its organic statute.8 8 However, Congress has not
threatened to replace the Fed's statute because this would impose drastic
economic and political costs.8 9
In the past, however, other societal preferences led the U.S. govern-
ment to respond differently. In 1834, for example, the Democratic Party
opposed the existence of a central bank and prevented its recharter under
the leadership of President Andrew Jackson.90 The Democratic govern-
ment faced no political penalty for violating the central bank commitment
because the Party was newly-born, and its populist constituancy opposed
84. See id. at 251-52.
85. See id.
86. See JEAN-FRANCOis.SOLNON, LA COUR DE FRANCE 523 (1987) (quoting Talleyrand
"France seemed to be made up of a certain number of societies with which the govern-
ment bargained. In this way, it kept each one under control using the credit that it had.
Then the government turned to another, dealing with it in the same way. How could
such a state of things continue?"). Root suggests that the difficulty in arranging negotia-
tions among corporate groups led to the Crown's inability to negotiate out of its dilemma
in 1789 Revolution. See RooT, supra note 75, at 229.
87. See DEANE & PRINGLE, supra note 49, at 50-52 and 217-18.
88. The powers of the Federal Reserve Board originated in the Federal Reserve Act of
1913. See Federal Reserve Act of 1913, 12 U.S.C. §§ 221-503 (1994) and 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1841-1850 (1994 & Supp. II 1997). This act created bank clearinghouses. See
MACEY & MILLER, supra note 45, at 16. The present structure of the Fed and the respon-
sibilities of the Board of Governors of the Fed were firmly fixed in the Banking Act of
1935. See DE.ANE & PRINGLE, supra note 49, at 215. Banking Act of 1935, 12 U.S.C. § 24
(Seventh) (1994 & Supp. 11 1997) (originally in 12 U.S.C. ch. 614, 49 Stat. 709). See
also JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 99TH Cob., MONETARISM, INFLATION AND THE FEDERAL
RESERVE 42 (Comm. Print 1985) (stating, in an essay by Benjamin M. Friedman, that the
independence of the U.S. central bank is "always strictly limited" but varies over time,
and such independent exercise of monetary policy is "not independent of the existing
[sic] structure of policymaking institutions, of course [because] the basic reality in this
case is the implicit threat of wholesale change by simple amendment of the Federal
Reserve Act, should the Administration and Congress agree on the need").
89. See DEANE & PRINGLE, supra note 49, at 218-19.
90. See Edward Meese III, Putting the Federal Judiciary Back on the Constitutional
Track, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 781, 790 (1998) ("Andrew Jackson disputed the [U.S.
Supreme] Court's decision, withdrew the federal treasury from [the Second Bank of the
United States], deposited it in state banks instead, and vetoed Congress's bill renewing
its charter.").
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the bank.91 No outside enforcement mechanism existed in the early
1830s, and the Democratic Party could externalize most of the costs from
violating the central banking commitment onto the opposing Whig Party.92
Thus, the incentives of the Democratic politicians were uniformly aligned
towards violating the banking commitment, which President Jackson
breached using outrageous methods.93 For the Democratic party, the com-
mitment to a central bank was not self-enforcing.9 4
II. Analysis: The Monetary Union Framework For Creating Credible
Commitments
This section applies the theory of credible commitments to the legal rules
of the EC Treaty. The terms of the EC Treaty prohibit Member States from
expanding their money supplies. However, as argued in Part II, Member
States have powerful incentives to violate these terms, unless the legal
structure makes the commitment credible. A credible commitment occurs
if (1) outside (or external) enforcement creates penalties that exceed the
benefits accruing from breach, or (2) if a self-created legal structure forces
governments to internalize the costs of breaching the agreement and these
costs exceed those incurred in maintaining the agreement.
Subsection A outlines the basic legal structure of monetary union, and
argues that conflicts of interests by decision makers promote ruptures in
credible commitments. Subsection B examines deficiencies in the first type
of credible commitment (i.e., those based on external enforcement) and
concludes that the current deficiencies in the legal structure allow Member
States to circumvent outside penalties for breaching commitments against
91. At the time, the Democratic populist constituents distrusted the Northeastern
financiers and the Second Bank of the United States, which was associated with the
Whig Party. SeeJu1Es L. PIERCE, THE FuTuRE OF BANKING 36 (1991) (stating thatJackson
vetoed the bank in 1832 because "Jackson's belief in states' rights, his concern for agra-
rian issues, and his distrust of banks in general and the economically and politically
powerful Bank of the United States in particular had predisposed him to oppose the
bank").
92. See id.
93. These methods included Jackson usurping the role of the judicial branch and
declaring the central bank to be unconstitutional. See Meese, supra note 90, at 790 (stat-
ing that although the constitutionality of the Second Bank of the United States was
affirmed by the Supreme Court in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1819), Jackson disputed this decision as grounds for his veto). See also quotation in
supra note 90.
94. In other countries, similar problems continue to exist today. For example, when
Argentina passed the Central Bank Reform Act of 1992, the act intended to give Argen-
tina's central bank autonomy from all powers of the state. The act stated that among the
central bank's essential functions were commitments to preserve the value of the peso
and eliminate temporary self-advances and self-purchases of government securities. Ini-
tial success in attracting international capital made this bank reform law appear credi-
ble, because the government would seemingly not want to threaten the new inflow of
capital into the economy. Later debt-spending by the Menem administration, however,
cast financial doubts over whether the central bank was allowing expansion of the
money supply at the behest of the government. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Constitutional
Moments, Precommitment, and Fundamental Reform: The Case of Argentina, 71 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1061 (1993).
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monetary expansion. Subsection C analyzes deficiencies in the second
type of credible commitment (i.e., those based on self-enforcement) and
concludes that the legal structure allows Member States to externalize the
costs of breach. In this sense, the current legal structure does not support
credible commitments.
A. Commitments and Conflicts in The Basic Legal Structure of
Monetary Union
Seen from a distance, EU organizations seem to be able to control the
money supply by controlling the issuance of bank notes, defining and
implementing monetary policy, and overseeing payment systems. Provi-
sions in the EC Treaty attempt to structure the monetary union to prevent
Member States from expanding the money supply. The ECB and the ESCB
administer the monetary union.95 The ECB has legal personality96 and
has exclusive right to authorize the issue of banknotes within the Commu-
nity.97 The ESCB is composed of both the ECB and the NCBs, 98 and its
primary objective is to maintain price stability (to prevent inflation).99
The ESCB's relevant basic tasks are to define and implement the monetary
policy of the EC and promote the smooth operation of payment systems.100
In addition to regulating monetary policy, the Maastricht provisions
attempt to prevent monetary expansion by government expenditure (fiscal
policy). To limit Member States' ability to use fiscal policy, the Treaty for-.
bids the ESCB from assuming debts or obligations of central governments
or regional, local or other public authorities or public firms, with the
exception of mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of specific
projects. 1 1 As a result, Member States cannot finance monetary expan-
95. See DIXON, supra note 50, at 113.
96. See JOSEPHINE SHAW, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 133 (1996).
97. See EC TREATY, supra note 13, art. 105a(1). Issuing money is a considered the
heart of traditional state functions. See J.A. USHER, THE LAW OF MONEY AND FiNANcIAL
SERVICES IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 177 (1994).
98. See EC TREATY, supra note 13, art. 106(1).
99. See id. art. 105(1) (Without prejudice to the primary objective of price stability,
the ESCB "shall support the general economic policies of the Community with a view to
contributing to the achievement of the objective of the Community.... ."); see also Bak-
ker & Wolswijk, supra note 55, at 80.
100. See EC TREATY, supra note 13, art 105(2), first indent and fourth indent. The
other two tasks of the ESCB are to conduct foreign exchange operations consistent with
the provisions of Article 109 of the EC Treaty and to hold and manage the official for-
eign reserves of the Member States. See id. art. 105(2), second and third indents.
The term payment systems refers to the intermediate stages of money transfer from
one party to another. Defining such systems is complex. The economic definition is
"every item suitable for use as a means of payment - such as cash, cheques and credit
cards - and every network" through which money is transferred from one party to
another - such as a bank-to- customer network, bank-to-bank network, or postal ser-
vice. But the legal definition, which involves passing of liability, is "the correct and
complete fulfillment of a pecuniary obligation that consists of the final transfer of the
absolute availability of money due to the creditor." MAIA CHIARA MALAGUTI, THE PAY-
MENT SYSTEM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 11, 22 (1997).
101. See EC TREATY, supra note 13, art. 104b; see also MEHNERT-MELAND, supra note 44,
at 81.
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sion through loans from the ESCB. Member States also cannot shift their
public debt and other commitments onto the coffers of other Member
States or the EU.x02 After stanching the ability for Member States to obtain
loans from the ESCB, the EC Treaty limits Member State self-financing by
limiting government deficits and prescribing procedures to trim away
"excessive" government deficit.103
Although Maastricht provisions regulate monetary policy and attempt
to limit fiscal policy, conflicts of interest in ESCB decision-making impede
credibility, because these conflicts may effect decisions about the enforce-
ment of commitments. In addition, as argued in the next subsection, these
enforcement provisions are weak. If the EU legal structure both did not
impose a conflict of interest on enforcement decision-makers, and had
strong enforcement penalties or rewards, the strength of outside enforce-
ment mechanisms would present a much more credible commitment
against monetary expansion: the first type of credible commitment).
Enforcement is a concern because, as argued in Part I, Member States have
strong incentives for monetary expansion. Also, the legal structures pro-
vide the ESCB with (1) branch NCBs in each Member State rather than
regional branches, as does the Fed; (2) looser control over these branches
than the Fed; (3) financial markets existing in almost each Member State,
allowing the capacity for somewhat localized open market operations; and
(4) little to no control over Member State fiscal policy, for tax and
spending.104
A conflict of interest exists among most of the members of the central
ESCB decision-making body, the Governing Council. The Governing
Council is comprised of all governors of the NCBs 10 5 and the Executive
Board.10 6 These make decisions for both the ESCB and the ECB.10 7 How-
102. See MEHRT-MELAND, supra note 44, at 81.
103. See EC TREATY, supra note 13, art. 104c(2)(b); see also Protocol on the Excessive
Deficit Procedure in MEHNERT-MELAND, supra note 44, at 164. Excessive government def-
icit is defined, in part, as a ratio of 60% of government debt to gross domestic product at
market prices. See id.
104. See supra notes 49-53.
105. See EC Treaty, supra note 14, art. 106. The Governing Council consists of all the
governors of the NCBs. Governing Council members may only vote if present (unless
teleconferencing exists under art. 12.3); each has one vote and actions are by simple
majority. A quorum of two-thirds of the members is required for voting, but the Presi-
dent may convene an extraordinary meeting without regard to quorum. See ESCB Stat-
ute, supra note 44, arts. 10.1 and 10.2.
106. The Executive Board includes the President, the Vice-President, and four other
members of professional standing and recognized experience. See ESCB Statute, supra
note 44, art. 11.1; EC TREATY, supra note 13, art. 109a(2)(a). The current members of
the Executive Board are President Wim Duisenberg, from Holland; Otmar Issing, chief
economist (and former chief economist of the Bundesbank), from Germany; Tommaso
Padoa-Schioppa, in charge of banking supervision and international relations, from
Italy; Eugenio Domingo Solans, in charge of payment systems, from Spain; Sirrka
Hdmklkinen, chief comptroller of the currency, from Finland; and Christian Noyer, in
charge of internal administration, from France. See Wolfgang M~inchau, Who Are Those
Masked Men?, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY, Sept./Oct. 1998, at 20-23.
107. Decision-making organizatins include the Governing Council, the Executive
Board, and - as long as some Member States derogate from monetary union - the
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ever, a majority of decision-makers in the Governing Council of the ESCB
and ECB perform two jobs. Although the governors of the NCBs simulta-
neously sit in the Governing Council of the ESCB and the ECB, these same
governors also must administer their NCBs in a non-EU national
capacity. 108
Despite their bifurcated duties, NCB governors have extensive powers
to decide issues regulating monetary expansion, including sole power to
decide certain lay issues, and cannot be removed without a supermajority
vote. In the Governing Council, the governors of NCBs - together with the
Executive Board - formulate the monetary policy of the Community,
adopt guidelines, and make decisions to perform the ESCB's basic
tasks.10 9 NCBs are obliged to follow these guidelines and instructions, and
the NCB governors and Executive Board in the Governing Council enforce
compliance. 110
Many important decisions regulating monetary expansion are decided
solely by the NCB governors."' Only the NCB governors determine
General Council. See EC TREATY, supra note 13, art. 106(3); see also supra note I (listing
current derogation states). A third organization, governing coordination with non-par-
ticipating Member States, occurs in the General Council, which includes the members of
the Governing Council and representatives from non-participating Member States. See
EC TREATY, supra note 13, art. 1091(3); ESCB Statute, supra note 44, art. 53. Members of
the Executive Board other than the President and Vice-President do not have the right to
vote in the General Council. The General Council's tasks are to take over the exchange
rate functions of the European Monetary Institute in art. 1091(5) - which coordinated
exchange rates before monetary union - and to help include the nonparticipating states
in monetary union under the process of Article 109k. See UsiER, supra note 96, at 176.
Otherwise, the General Council is somewhat separated from direct decision-making
because under Article 47.4 of the ESCB Statute, "the General Council shall be informed
by the President of the ECB of decisions of the Governing Council." Id. See also Rules of
Procedure of the General Council of the European Central Bank, 1999 OJ. (L 075)
(1998) (giving the rules of procedure of the General Council).
108. See TOMMASO PADoA-ScHIOPPA, THE ROAD TO MONETARY UNION IN EuRoPE: THE
EMPEROR, THE KINGS, AND mE GE NEs 232 (1994) (noting that decentralization within the
ESCB has sometimes been confused with retention of strong national jurisdiction in
supervision and that confusion may exist whether (in carrying out supervisory respon-
sibilities) a NCB is acting under national powers or as part of the ESCB). ESCB Statute
art. 14.4 grants to the NCBs the power to perform functions on their own responsibility
and liabilities; these functions "shall not be regarded as part of the functions of the
ESCB." ESCB Statute, supra note 44, art. 14.4; see also infra note 111 for the text of 14.4
The Governing Council can limit these functions only if it finds, by a two-thirds major-
ity, that they interfere with objectives and tasks of the ESCB. See id.
109. See MALAG Ti, supra note 101, at 282. The Executive Board's implements these
decisions. See id. See also KENEN, supra note 42, at 66 (stating that "governors of the
national central banks will have more influence in the ECB than presidents of the Fed-
eral Reserve Banks ... [because] they will all be voting members of the Governing Coun-
cil, where they will outnumber the members of the Executive Board..."). Kenen further
argues that NCB governors are likely to oppose any method of monetary management
that benefits one Member State over another. See id.
110. See MALAG Un, supra note 101, at 283 and ESCB Statute, supra note 44, art. 14.3.
NCBs can be compelled to disclose necessary information. See ESCB Statute, supra note
44, art. 14.3.
111. See Niall Lenihan, The Role and Framework of the European System of Central
Banks, 1090 PLI/Corp 463, 467 (1999) (stating "a crucial operational feature of the
[ESCB] is that, while monetary policy will be established by the ECB Governing Council
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reserve requirements, the allocations of profits earned by NCBs, and the
expenditure of revenue by NCBs and the ECB for administering monetary
policy. These include decisions taken under Articles 28 (capital reserves
of the ECB), 29 (key for subscription of the ECBs capital), 30 (transfer of
foreign reserve assets to the ECB), 32 (allocation of income produced by
NCBs), 33 (allocation of net profits and losses of ECB) and 51 (derogations
from Article 32 in the case of large relative differences in NCB's
income). 112 In addition, NCBs can perform functions other than those
specified by the ESCB. 113
Moreover, the EC Treaty currently grants the Governing Council only
limited power to restrict the activities of the NCBs. Specifically, the Treaty
provides that the Governing Council can limit the functions of the NCBs if
it determines by a two-thirds majority that these functions interfere with
the- objectives and tasks of the ESCB. However, in practical terms, the
NCBs may circumvent the Council's authority without great difficulty. The
number of votes cast is weighted according to each NCB's share of sub-
scribed capital in the ECB. 114 For example, in the case of Oskar Lafon-
taine's opposition, if the German NCB governor also opposed a Governing
Council limitation on German monetary expansion, then Germany and
another state probably could prevent a two-thirds majority. Hence, an
NCB effectively could prevent the Governing Council from limiting the
NCB's functions. Also, the Treaty does not prescribe how the Council may
limit the NCBs' functions or define the permissible extent of such
limitations.115
meeting in Frankfurt, monetary policy will be implemented on a decentralized basis
through the 11 national central banks. Open market operations pumping liquidity into
the financial system, or withdrawing liquidity, will be conducted through the dealing
rooms in the 11 national central banks."). See also ESCB Statute, supra note 44, art.
10.3. These include decisions taken under Article 28 (capital reserves of the ECB), Arti-
cle 29 (key for subscription of the ECBs capital), Article 30 (transfer of foreign reserve
assets to the ECB), Article 32 (allocation of income produced by NCBs), Article 33 (allo-
cation of net profits and losses of ECB) and Article 51 (derogations from Article 32 if
large relative differences exist in NCB's income). On these issues, voting is weighted
according to the NCB's share of subscribed capital in the ECB; governors who cannot be
present for the vote may appoint a proxy. A decision by a qualified majority passes by
two-thirds of the subscribed capital of the ECB and one-half of the NCB shareholders.
See id.
112. See ESCB Statute, supra note 44, arts. 28-33, 51.
113. See id. art. 14.4 ("[Njational central banks may perform functions other than
those specified in this Statute, unless the Governing Council finds, by a two-thirds
majority of votes cast, that these interfere with the objectives and tasks of the ESCB.
Such functions shall be performed on the responsibility and liability of national central
banks and shall not be regarded as being part of the functions of the ESCB.").
114. See id. art. 14.4; see also MATTHiAS BRUECKNER, VOTING AND DECIsIONS IN THE ECB,
ECO No. 97/29 (1997) (arguing that the statutory rule leads to inefficient outcomes and
that sidepayments increase the efficiency of voting decisions in the ECB).
115. The Statute states merely that "national central banks may perform func-
tions... unless the Governing Council finds. ... " ESCB Statute, supra note 44, art.
14.4; Lenihan, supra note 109, at 467 (stating that monetary policy will be implemented
on a decentralized basis). The Governing Council can also compel an NCB to disclose
necessary information. See ESCB Statute, supra note 44, art. 14.3.
Vol. 33
2000 Deficiencies in Credible Commitment
In sum, the basic legal structure of monetary union creates outside
enforcement mechanisms and sets objectives for these mechanisms. How-
ever, the decision-makers for these outside enforcement mechanisms may
have conflicts of interests between their official EU capacity in the Gov-
erning Council and their administration of NCBs. This possible conflict of
interest impedes the establishment of credible commitments because those
members with potential conflicts of interest (e.g., NCB governors) have sole
authority to decide important monetary expansion issues, and cannot be
reproved without a supermajority vote. As the next section argues, the EC
Treaty allows further commitment deficiencies through weak enforcement
sanctions and sets a high threshold for censuring the actions of the NCBs
themselves. Thus, costs are unlikely to exceed the benefits accruing to
Member States for expanding the money supply.116 By failing to create
penalties that exceed benefits for breach, the legal structure of monetary
union fails to establish credible commitments based on external
enforcement.
B. Incompleteness of Outside Enforcement Mechanisms
The first type of credible commitment (based on outside enforcement) may
not exist because external enforcement institutions currently lack effective
sanctions to impose costs on Member States that exceed benefits for
breaching their commitment against monetary expansion. For purposes of
the credible commitment analysis, the external enforcement institutions
include sanctions by the ECB and other Community institutions.
1. ECB Sanctions
As mentioned above, the ECB can promulgate rules that have the force of
law. 117 The ECB can issue regulations on restricted topics 1 8 that are
binding on Member States, and the ECB can issue binding decisions." 19
However, the ECB can only impose very attenuated sanctions for viola-
tions, and these limited sanctions reduce the credibility of the ECB as an
outside enforcement mechanism. The EC Treaty currently limits sanctions
to fines or periodic penalty payments having a maximum total of about 1.8
116. See supra Part UII.
117. See Lenihan, supra note 109, at 466; see also EC TaF.ArY, supra note 13, art.
108a(1).
118. See EC TREAry, supra note 13, art. 108a(1) (limiting ECB regulations to tasks
defined in ESCB Statute Article 3.1, first indent, Articles 19.1, 22, 25.2, and in acts of
the Council under 106(6)). The ECB can issue regulations that define and implement
the monetary policy of the Community (ESCB Statute art. 3.1, first indent), set mini-
mum reserves for "credit institutions" (ESCB Statute art. 19.1), regulate clearing and
payment systems (ESCB Statute art. 22), perform tasks to supervise "credit institutions"
and other financial institutions except insurance (ESCB Statute art. 25.2), or under the
acts of the Council in Article 106(6). However, sanctions do not apply to these topics
unless adopted by the Council as provided in ESCB Statute art. 42 and EC Treaty art.
106(6).
119. See EC TrAv, supra note 13, art. 108a(1) and (2); ESCB Statute, supra note 44,
34.2, first and third indent. The ECB can also issue recommendations and opinions
wvith no binding force. See id. See also HADJIEMMAMNUIL, supra note 17, at 36.
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million euros. 120 In other words, the penalties for failure to comply with
the outside enforcement mechanisms of the ECB are solely pecuniary.
When a Member State faces recession - including dramatic noncompeti-
tiveness of industry and labor unemployment - fines and periodic penalty
payments of 1.8 million euros seem unlikely to outweigh the benefits from
monetary expansion. The increase in a Member State's gross domestic
product (GDP) from counter-cyclical monetary policy and government
expenditure will almost certainly exceed the impact of monetary sanctions.
Consequently, ECB sanctions do not adequately enforce Member States'
commitments against monetary expansion.
Even more seriously, ECB sanctions currently do not apply to certain
areas involving monetary policy. Although the ECB can issue regulations
on a range of issues pursuant to under Article 108a(1) of the EC Treaty, its
enforcement authority is limited. 12 1 The Treaty provides that the ECB's
fines and penalty payments only apply within the limits and conditions set
by the European Council under Article 106(6).122 Under the EC Treaty,
the ECB is not authorized to impose sanctions regarding prudential super-
vision of credit and financial institutions or regarding payment systems, 12 3
because Article 106(6) makes no reference to these provisions. 12 4 In addi-
tion, the ECB may not impose sanctions to help meets its obligation "to
define and implement the monetary policy of the Community."12 5 Conse-
quently, the ECB can issue regulations on issues under 108a(1), but is not
authorized to have sanctions to enforce those regulations. 12 6
120. See EC TRaTY, supra note 13, art. 108a(3); ESCB Statute, supra note 44, art. 34.3
and MEHNERT-MELAND, supra note 44, at 87. The ECB can impose a maximum fine of
500,000 euros, together with a maximum penalty payment of 10,000 euros per day for
no longer than six months (resulting in a maximum sum of about 1,800,000 euros). See
Council Regulation 2532/98, art. 1(a) and (b), 1998 Oj. (L 318) (1998) (promulgating
the exclusive regulation that allows the ECB to impose an infringement procedure on a
national central bank performing tasks of the ESCB).
121. See EC TREATY, supra note 13, art. 108a(1).
122. See id. art. 108a(3) ("[W]ithin the limits and under the conditions adopted by
the Council under the procedure laid down in Article 106(6), the ECB shall be entitled
to impose fines or periodic penalty payments on undertakings for failure to comply with
obligations under its regulations and decisions"); see also ESCB Statute, supra note 44,
art. 34.3; SMITs, supra note 48, at 494 (listing ECB sanctions and stating that no specific
sanctions apply if not referenced in EC Treaty Article 106(6) or ESCB Statute Article 42).
The European Council is specially composed of Member States' Economic and Finance
Ministers for decisions on areas of capital payments and economic and monetary policy.
See EC TREATY, supra note 13, Declaration (No. 3) on Part Three, Title Ill, Chapter 4 and
Title VI.
123. See infra section C.
124. Article 22 of the ESCB Statute refers to payment systems; Article 25.2 refers to
prudential supervision of credit institutions and financial institutions. See SMiTs, supra
note 48, at 494.
125. See ESCB Statute, supra note 44, art. 3.1 and HAnJUE-MANUIL, supra note 17, at 32
(describing these strictly advisory functions).
126. See ESCB Statute, supra note 44, art. 3.1 (the equivalent of EC Treaty Article
108a(1) is not listed among the enforcement provisions of EC Treaty Article 106(6)).
Article 106(b) gives the ECB power to enforce regulations for ESCB Statute Articles 4,
5.4, 19.2, 20, 28.1, 29.2, 30.4, and 34.3; these are discussed herein.
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Even where the ECB may impose sanctions, it remains dependent on
other Community institutions and secondary legislation, except that it may
impose direct sanctions for violations of minimum reserve requirements of
credit institutions. Other provisions for fines and penalty payments are
only invoked on the basis of the European Council's secondary legisla-
tion.127 The European Council must also pass secondary legislation for
the ECB to impose sanctions for improper collection of statistics 128 or to
grant "other instruments of monetary control." 129 In sum, because the
ECB primarily has only weak, curtailed or indirect enforcement rights
through other institutions, its ability to impose direct sanctions is limited
to imposing 1.8 million euros in fines and penalty interest or punishing
credit institutions that violate minimum reserve requirements. 130
2. Non-ECB Sanctions
Apart from sanctions by the ECB, the sanctions of other outside enforce-
ment mechanisms are similarly weak, and thereby impede creation of
external enforcement credible commitments. Article 103 of the EC Treaty
provides that the European Council can make "recommendations" to a
Member State13 1 when it violates the broad economic guidelines of the
Community132 or "risks jeopardizing the functions of economic and mone-
tary union."133 As a stiffer penalty, by qualified majority vote, the Council
can make a public announcement that the offending Member State contra-
vened the Council's broad guidelines. 134
Sanctions comparable to fines and penalty payments also exist if
Member States breach deficit and debt requirements. If a Member State
127. See ESCB Statute, supra note 44, art. 34.3; MERN-ET-Mm.AND, supra note 44, at
87.
128. See ESCB Statute, supra note 44, art. 5.4. In contrast to fines and penalty inter-
est, the sanctions granted to the ECB for failures in collecting statistical information is
"appropriate provisions for enforcement."
129. Id. art. 20, first and second paragraphs; MEHNERT-MELAND, supra note 44, at 80.
130. See ESCB Statute, supra note 44, art. 19.1. ESCB Statute art. 19.2 also gives the
ECB power to impose "appropriate sanctions in cases of noncompliance" with minimum
reserve requirements of credit institutions, if the European Council passes applicable
secondary legislation. Hence, in the case of minimum reserves, the Treaty is more strin-
gent. See Lenihan, supra note 109, at 468. See also European Central Bank Regulation
2818/98, 1998 OJ. (L 356) (1998) (promulgating specifics for regulation of the reserve
requirements of credit institutions and credit institution branches within participating
Member States).
131. The Community monitors Member States economic programs for consistency
with these guidelines. See EC TREATY, supra note 13, art. 103(3). The European Com-
mission submits reports on Member States' economic developments and their consis-
tence with the broad guidelines to the European Council. See id.
132. Community institutions formulate broad guidelines for the economic policies of
Member States under Article 103. Such guidelines are passed by qualified majority vote
of the Council, upon recommendation by the Commission and with consultation of the
European Council. See id. art. 103(2); see also HADJIEmmAN1L, supra note 17, at 35
("[T]he ECB is not intended to replace the competent authorities, but only to assist in the
performance of their functions.").
133. See EC TREATY, supra note 13, art. 103(4).
134. See id. art. 103(4).
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violates a timetable for deficit adjustment, the EC Treaty provides for possi-
ble mandatory disclosure about issuance of bonds or securities, a possible
mandatory non-interest-bearing deposit with the Community, and appro-
priate fines.' 35 Of more substance but higher uncertainty, the European
Council can "invite" the European Investment Bank to "reconsider its lend-
ing policy" for this Member State.' 36 However, this sanction requires a
two-thirds majority vote in the European Council, by qualified majority
weight, after a recommendation by the Commission. 137
The final remaining Community institution with power to sanction a
Member State engaging in monetary expansion is the European Court of
Justice. The Court of Justice's power is significant for creation of credible
commitments and will be discussed at length in Part IV.
Hence, because of the current weakness of outside enforcement provi-
sions (other than the Court ofJustice), the outside enforcement institutions
of monetary union currently do not seem to provide external enforcement-
based credible commitments against monetary expansion. As noted above,
the incentives for monetary expansion include public counter-cyclical pol-
icy benefits, political self-interest benefits, government fiscal interest bene-
fits, and collective action benefits. When Member States are faced with a
recession, all these benefits - including the prospective increase in aggre-
gate GDP from monetary expansion - seem to outweigh the EC Treaty's
weak sanction of fines and periodic penalty payments and related meas-
ures. When a Member State's government has the political ideology to use
fiscal or monetary policy - as do many social democratic parties in power
in Member States' 38 - the Treaty's weak sanctions are even less effective.
Consequently, the Treaty's current external enforcement provisions do not
establish a credible commitment against monetary expansion.
C. Self-Enforcing Credible Commitment Problems in the Legal
Structure
Although existing outside enforcement mechanisms do not establish the
first type of credible commitments, a self-enforcing credible commit-
ment' 39 against monetary expansion may exist if (1) a self-created legal
structure forces Member States to internalize the costs of breaching the
agreement and (2) these costs exceed the costs for maintaining the agree-
135. See id. art. 104c(11) (stating "fines of appropriate size" but not specifying quan-
tities) and MEHNERT-MELAND, supra note 44, at 80.
136. See EC TREATY, supra note 13, art. 104c(11), third indent. The European Invest-
ment Bank, governed by provisions of EC Treaty Article 198d-e, was established by the
Treaty of Rome and provides investment loans to assist the funding of regional develop-
ment projects in the EU, and to assist development projects by two or more Member
States. Its revenue is derived from money subscriptions by Member States and from its
own investments. See SHAw, supra note 96, at 132-33.
137. See EC TRE.AaTY, supra note 13, art. 104c(13). The voting is weighted by qualified
majority numbers under Article 148; the breaching Member State's votes are excluded.
See id.
138. See supra note 9.
139. See supra Part III.
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ment. However, as the legal structure of monetary union presently allows
Member States to externalize costs of breach, it fails to establish the basis
for effective self-enforcing credible commitments. The problematic legal
provisions include provisions regulating government expenditure and
monetary policy. Specific deficiencies in the legal structure include provi-
sions regarding credit access, credit institutions, and payments systems.
1. Problems in Credit Access
The Treaty currently fails to prevent credit access by Member States to the
ESCB. Although, as described in Part A, the Treaty forbids the ESCB from
assuming the debts and obligations of governments or public firms, 140
provisions barring the ESCB from extending loans to governments are less
exhaustive. In theory, a NCB could try to expand the money supply by
extending credit to a government pursuing fiscal policy or purchasing gov-
ernment bonds (monetary policy). Consequently, the Treaty prohibits
credit or overdraft facilities acting between the ECB or NCBs and govern-
ments or public firms. Under Article 104(1), the Treaty forbids credit or
overdraft facilities for any public entity, including central or local govern-
ments, public bodies, or public corporations. 141 The ECB and NCBs also
cannot directly purchase debt instruments (such as government bonds)
from any public entity142 of a Member State after 1999.143
However, the EC Treaty does not address the indirect extension of
credit - extension other than through credit or overdraft facilities - to
government or public firms that may be used for monetary expansion.
Indirect purchase of debt instruments from governments and public firms
may be permissible, because the Treaty provisions only prohibit direct
purchases. 144 In addition, the ESCB Statute actually provides for a finan-
cial agency relationship between the ECB and NCBs and governments and
public firms, and the scope of this agency relationship has not yet been
defined.145 An NCB may also invoke its prerogative to perform functions
140. See EC TiRATY, supra note 13, art.104b; MEHmaT-ME.ANDo, supra note 44, at 81.
141. See EC TREATY, supra note 13, art. 104(1).
142. See id.
143. See Council Regulation 3603/93, art. 2(2), 1993 Oj. (L 332). Terminating on
January 1, 1999, the NCBs of participating Member States could purchase "debt instru-
ments" of another Member State's public sector, if these purchases were for the sole
purpose of managing foreign exchange reserves. See id. art 2(1). The Regulation con-
tains definitions (and restrictions) on the terms "overdraft facilities," "debt instru-
ments," "public sector," "credit facilities" and "public undertaking."
144. See EC TREATY, supra note 13, art. 104(1). In Council Regulation 3603/93, 1993
Oj. (L 332) (1993), the EU Council does not define "direct purchases" but does indicate
conditions that were not "direct purchases" and types of credits that were not "credit
facilities." These are safe harbors, but do not prohibit other interpretations of "direct
purchases." See also MEHN'RT-MELAN', supra note 44, at 24 (transactions that are not
"direct purchases" are in NCB transactions in derogating states and participating states
or the ECB); KENEN, supra note 42, at 70 (Article 104 exempts open-market purchases).
145. See ESCB Statute, supra note 44, art. 21.2 ("The ECB and national central banks
may act as fiscal agents for the entities referred to in Article 21.1," [i.e., "Community
institutions or bodies, central governments, regional, or local or other public authorities,
other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of Member States"].).
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other than those specified by the ESCB, 146 and may include some form of
credit extension as one such function.
Such extension of credit could be entirely permissible under Maas-
tricht, although such action might effect the primary objective of price sta-
bility under Article 105(1). 14 7 An NCB governor faced with a recession
has a number of legal arguments to favor a credit extension. The governor
also could argue that the credit extension is unlikely to effect price stabil-
ity, although prices across the euro zone may fluctuate slightly. 148 The
governor could argue that this credit extension falls within the "general
principles" for credit operations (and open market operations) promul-
gated by the ECB. 149 The Treaty itself also lends additional support, since
it generally requires the ECB to seek to devolve operations to the NCBs.1 50
Finally, the governor could argue that the financial measure is not a legal
instrument that "obliges" financial institutions to hold public sector liabili-
ties,' 5 ' and that it may fall under the exception for prudential considera-
tions provided in the Treaty.' 5 2 Even if a majority of NCB governors and
Executive Board members find these arguments objectionable, where the
hypothetical governor's functions are not specified by the ESCB Statute
(i.e., indirect extensions of credit), the Maastricht legal structure will
approve the hypothetical governor's functions unless objections by NCB
146. See ESCB Statute, supra note 44, art. 14.4. The statute provides that these func-
tions are performed at the responsibility and liability of the NCBs and are not regarded
as part of the functions of the ESCB. See also PADoA-ScHIOPPA, supra note 106, at 232.
147. The ECB promulgates "general principles" for credit operations and open-market
operations carried out by itself or by the NCBs. See HADJIEMMANUIL, supra note 17, at 32-
34.
148. The primary objective of the ESCB is price stability. See EC TREATY, supra note
13, art. 105(1). See also DANIEL GRos, TowARDs ECONOMIC AND MoNETARY UNION:
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 32-34 (Center for European Policy Studies Paper No. 65, 1996)
149. See ESCB Statute, supra note 44, art. 18.2 ("the ECB shall establish general prin-
ciples for open market and credit operations carried out by itself or the national central
banks, including for the announcement of conditions under which they stand ready to
enter into such transactions").
150. See id. art. 12.1, third paragraph, requiring the ECB to devolve to the NCBs to
carry out ESCB operations "to the extent deemed possible and appropriate and without
prejudice to this Article." See also SMITs, supra note 48, at 243.
151. This type of legal instrument is prohibited as "any measure establishing privi-
leged access" under EC Treaty Article 104a(1). Council Regulation 3603/93, Article
2(2), 1993 OJ. (L 332), lists measures which are not privileged access under section
1(2), but does not stipulate that this list is conclusive.
152. See EC TREATY, supra note 13, art. 104a(1). Prudential considerations are
defined as considerations that underlie national (Member State) law consistent with
Community law, and "promote the soundness of financial institutions with the goal to
strengthening the stability of the financial system as a whole and the protection of the
customers of those institutions." Council Regulation 3603/93, art. 2, 1993 OJ. (L 332).
Financial institutions are defined in art. 4 of this regulation. A simple argument is that
such extensions of credit for monetary expansion strengthen the stability of the finan-
cial system as a whole (the text does not stipulate "strengthen price stability") and pro-
mote the soundness of these financial institutions.
Vol. 33
2000 Deficiencies in Credible Commitment
governors and the Executive Board reach the high threshold of two-thirds
votes cast.
15 3
Thus, a self-enforcing credible commitment does not now exist to pre-
vent Member States from expanding the money supply by extensions of
credit. The legal structure seems to allow for extensions of credit by NCBs
to Member States, and a Member State could thereby externalize its financ-
ing costs for monetary expansion.
2. Problems of "Credit Institutions"
The commitment against monetary expansion is also not now self-enforc-
ing (fulfilling the second type of credible commitment) because of the lack
of clarity in the ESCB's regulation of "credit institutions." The monetary
policy of the ESCB hinges on the term "credit institutions." To conduct
monetary policy according to the Treaty, the ECB and the NCBs may open
accounts for "credit institutions, public entities and other market partici-
pants,"15 4 and may conduct credit operations via "credit institutions and
other market participants."15 5 In addition to using credit institutions for
accounts and credit operations, the ECB may (1) impose on credit institu-
tions (including public credit institutions)15 6 a minimum reserve require-
ment;15 7 (2) supervise credit institutions' financial management;' 5 8 (3)
impose "specific tasks" related to their financial management;' 5 9 and (4)
"contribute to" the policies of authorities supervising credit institutions.160
153. See ESCB Statute, supra note 44, art. 14.4. The voting scheme is not one vote per
member; rather, each voting member may cast a certain number of votes based on the
capital contribution of his or her Member State.
154. See id. art. 17.
155. Id. art. 18.1. The ESCB can also conduct credit operations with "other market
participants." See Lenihan, supra note 109, at 468.
156. See EC TREATY, supra note 13, art. 104(2). All restrictions on the use of credit
and overdraft facilities, described in the last section, do not apply to public credit institu-
tions. See ESCB Statute, supra note 44, art. 21.3. Thus, public credit institutions proba-
bly can directly extend credit to. Member States' public entities, subject to a reserve
requirement. The provision probably intends to make public credit institutions equally
competitive with private institutions in the market for government financing.
157. See ESCB Statute, supra note 44, arts. 21.3, 19.2. The ECB can impose reserve
requirements on credit institutions with accounts from the ECB and NCBs. The reserve
requirements are determined by the Governing Council of the ECB. See id. art. 19.1. If
credit institutions violate their reserve requirements, the ECB can impose penalty inter-
est or other sanctions. See id. The bases for reserves and the ratio between reserves and
bases and other sanctions for non-compliance can be decided by the Governing Council.
See Article 42 of the ESCB Statute art. 19.2; MEHNERT-MELAND, supra note 44, at 79.
158. See ESCB Statute, supra note 44, art. 25.1. ESCB Statute art. 3.3 also provides
that the ESCB can "contribute to the smooth conduct of policies" of entities regulated.
See also HADJIEMMANul., supra note 17, at 32.
159. ESCB Statute, supra note 44, art. 25.2. The ECB and NCBs may also perform
specific tasks on "financial institutions." Id. This term is also not defined in the Treaty.
See Smits, supra, note 48, at 236. The term "financial institutions" also is used in Article
23 of the ESCB Statute, which says that the ECB and national central banks may estab-
lish relations with central banks and financial institutions in other countries. See ESCB
Statute, supra note 44, art. 23; MEHNmT-MELAND, supra note 44, at 81.
160. See ESCB Statute, supra note 44, art. 3.3; EC TREATY, supra note 13, art. 105(5).
ESCB Statute art. 3.3 provides that the ESCB shall "contribute to the smooth conduct of
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Also, all restrictions on the use of credit and overdraft facilities 161 do not
apply to public credit institutions, which are regulated like private credit
institutions. 162
The Treaty does not define credit institutions, despite the importance
of the term. Therefore, the extent of the ESCB's control over banking insti-
tutions and regulations of monetary policy remains uncertain. Commenta-
tors argue that the lack of a definition shows a gap by the Treaty framers on
considering the impact of the supervision of credit institutions on mone-
tary policy. 163
While the term "credit institution" does not have a fixed meaning
under the Treaty, 164 the extent to which credit institutions will allow mone-
tary expansion may depend on the scope of the term's definition. 165 The
drafting committee of the ESCB, the Committee of Governors, referred to
the definition used in the Community's First Banking Directive, which
defines a credit institution as "an undertaking whose business is to receive
deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for
its own account."'166 But this reference can be equivocally interpreted and
probably was intended as a minimum definition. 167 This definition is also
overinclusive, because many institutions receive types of deposits and grant
credit, including commercial banks, investment banks, and money market
funds.168 Thus, the legal structure does not specify through which institu-
tions the ESCB will conduct credit operations, regulate liquidity extensions
(via minimum reserve requirements), or monitor financial management.
Consequently, the Treaty contains a gap in the extent of the ESCB's regula-
tion of monetary policy. Moreover, the Treaty does not restrict which pub-
lic credit institutions can engage in fiscal policy (government
policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision of
credit institutions and the stability of the financial system."
161. See supra section C.1.
162. See EC TREATY, supra note 13, art. 104(2); ESCB Statute, supra note 44, art. 21.3.
163. See Rose Maria Lastra, The Independence of the European System of Central Banks,
33 Hav. INr'L LJ. 512 (1992) (stating that "disruptive effects" can result from the lack
of a dearly defined banking supervisory role for the ESCB); see also SMiTs, supra note 48,
at 236 ("[T]he absence of clear language on the meaning of the term 'credit institution'
seems to reveal that the issue of application of monetary policy to the subjects of pru-
dential supervision has not received adequate reflection by [the] authors.").
164. See SMITS, supra note 48, at 236.
165. See Lastra, supra note 163, at 513. See also SMiTs, supra note 48, at 236.
166. First Banking Directive, First Council Directive of 12 December 1977 (77/780/
EEC), 1977 OJ. (L 322) 30, as amended.
167. See ESCB Draft Statute, Agence Eur., Europe, Document No. 1669/1670, Dec. 8,
1990, at 24. See also SMiTS, supra note 48, at 237 (arguing that the central concern of the
First Banking Directive was to protect creditors rather than considerations of monetary
policy).
168. For an analysis of the U.S. approach to defining banks, see MAcEY & MILLER,
supra note 45, at 350 (examining parallel overinclusivity and underinclusivity in the
definition of bank, in the context of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956).
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expenditures), such as industry-specific, public procurement or general
public assistance programs. 169
The lack of a definition for credit institutions creates uncertainty
about the extent to which the ESCB can control banking institutions, par-
ticularly public credit institutions, which are regulated like private credit
institutions. 170 This may lead to the externalization of costs by grey-area
institutions, eroding the second type of credible commitment. Yet, remedy-
ing this uncertainty is extremely problematic and calls the credibility of
commitments into question. Amendments to the definition of "credit insti-
tutions" by the ECB or Community institutions would have drastic effect
on the exercise of monetary policy, because any such revision would deter-
mine the categories of financial institutions supervised and managed by
the ECB and NCBs.17' Some commentators suggest that amending the def-
inition of "credit institution" would violate the EC Treaty because such a
drastic change in the scope of monetary policy must be accomplished only
by a Treaty amendment, rather than by institutional legislation.' 72 Such a
loophole amendment procedure would give Community institutions the
power to alter the scope of the EC Treaty and thus cast doubt on the credi-
bility of Community institution commitments to restrict their own power.
As a result, the legal structure does not clearly define either the institu-
tions through which the ESCB can exercise monetary policy, or the institu-
tions that could be prohibited from influencing the money supply. Yet,
remeding of these gaps would be extremely problematic and, in the
absence of a Treaty amendment, could challenge self-enforcing credible
commitments in the structure of monetary union.
3. Problems in Payments Systems
Currently, the second type of credible commitment also is impaired by
gaps in the legal structure of payment systems. 173 These gaps must be
169. For an analysis of changes in the policies for public procurement in the EU, see
CHRISTOPHER Bovis, THE LIBERALIZATION Of PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND ITS EFFECT ON THE
COMMON MARKEr 26 (1998).
170. See EC TREATY, supra note 13, art. 104(2).
171. The ESCB can open accounts with and regulate "credit institutions." See
HADJIEMMAIIL, supra note 17, at 12-19 (analyzing regulation and prudential supervi-
sion of credit institutions).
172. See SMITS, supra note 48, at 238. In regard to amendments by Community insti-
tutions, a directive by the European Council would be require only a qualified majority
under Article 57(2), pursuant to the procedure of Article 189b. As to amendments of
the Treaty itself, amendment to the ESCB Statute, if proposed by the Commission, would
require unanimity in the European Council, and an amendment recommended by the
ECB would require unanimity in the ECB's Governing Council. See EC TREATY, supra
note 13, art. 106(5); ESCB Statute, supra note 44, art. 41.
173. The term "payment systems" refers to the intermediate stages of money transfer
from one party to another. The term's definition depends on whether it is being used in
an economic or legal sense. The economic definition is "every item suitable for use as a
means of payment - such as cash, cheques and credit cards - and every network"
through which money is transferred from one party to another (e.g., a bank-to- customer
network, bank-to-bank network, or postal service). The legal definition, which relates to
the passing of liability, is "the correct and complete fulfillment of a pecuniary obligation
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filled to allow the commitment against monetary expansion to be self-
enforcing.
One of the ESCB's basic tasks is to promote the smooth operation of
payment systems.174 Under the Treaty, the ECB has an obligation to per-
form this task itself or delegate the task to the NCBs. 175 A payment sys-
tem, in rough legal terms, 'transfers liability through the full performance of
an obligation (of availability of money) due the creditor.176 Payment sys-
tems serve as conduits for monetary policy operations and clear euro
transactions, including travelers' checks, eurocheques and credit cards, and
interbank transactions. 177 Transactions relating to monetary policy must
be made through a specialized payment system (TARGET), but the execu-
tion of other large payments may be outside this system. Alternative non-
EU large-value payment systems remain in operation. 178
The Treaty gives little direction on the nature of activities to be per-
formed through the ESCB to promote the smooth operation of the pay-
ments system. 179 The Treaty provides that the ESCB can establish facilities
to ensure the efficiency and soundness of payment systems.' 80 The ECB
can also make regulations for this purpose,18 and can perform "specific
tasks" - which may involve payments systems - concerning policies relat-
ing to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and other financial
institutions. 182
Otherwise, the Treaty gives no other direction on the nature of activi-
ties by the ESCB to promote the smooth operation of the payments system.
The Treaty is silent on the division of competence for this task between the
ECB and the NCBs. 183 Also, the Treaty is silent in the division between the
double powers of the ESCB payment systems and national payment sys-
tems, which are encouraged under the Treaty.184
that consists of the final transfer of the absolute availability of money due to the credi-
tor." See MALAGut, supra note 101, at 22.
174. See Lastra, supra note 163, at 514; EC TREATY, supra note 13, art. 105(2), fourth
indent.
175. See ESCB Statute, supra note 44, arts. 2, 9 and 22. Hadjiemmanuil notes that
because most Member States run payment systems by the NCBs in their capacity as
national authorities, rather than as members of the ESCB, it is questionable whether the
EC Treaty means that the ESCB can manage the payment systems directly. See HADiIEM.
MANUIL, supra note 17, at 41.
176. See ICC PUBLISHING S.A., ICC WORLD PAYMENT SYSTEMS HANDBOOK 72 (1996)
(defining payment systems generally as "a set of instruments, banking procedures and,
typically, interbank funds transfer systems that ensure the circulation of money").
177. See MALAGuTn, supra note 101, at 334.
178. See HADJIEMMANUIL, supra note 17, at 41 n. 148 (discussing the TARGET system);
see also infra note 190 and accompanying text.
179. See id. See also Lastra, supra note 161, at 514.
180. See ESCB Statute, supra note 44, art. 22.
181. See id.
182. See id. art. 25.2.
183. See Lastra, supra note 163, at 514. See also MALAGUTI, supra note 101, at 297 and
HAnJIEMMANUIL, supra note 17, at 41.
184. See SMITs, supra note 48, at 301 and MALAGuT, supra note 101, at 298.
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The dilemma over control of standards by the ESCB or national pay-
ment systems may determine externalization of costs (hence impairing the
second type of credible commitment). A central dilemma of payment sys-
tems is reconciling the principles of decentralization, the free market econ-
omy, and minimal government involvement in the provision of services
with the need to control the circulation of money, as a possible means of
controlling the money supply.' 8 5 If power to monitor payment systems
belongs exclusively to the ESCB, then the NCBs would apply uniform mon-
itoring standards. But if the NCBs could apply domestic standards to over-
see payment systems, then they would have greater scope in establishing
monitoring standards.' 8 6 If the latter approach is taken - and recent
Community reports favor this approach as following the principal of sub-
sidiarity' 8 7 - then different monitoring standards would apply to acces-
sing the same supply of money. This would allow Member States with
lower monitoring standards to externalize risk and associated costs onto
the whole monetary system, thereby impairing the second type of credible
commitment. In addition, proposals for decentralizing monitoring stan-
dards for access to payment systems assume that the NCBs will be minor
operators on the market.'88 However, if the NCBs are active operators in
their market (or wish to be active because of a recession), they could face a
conflict of interest between standards for payment as market participants
and as monitors (i.e., between their monetary policy payments and their
domestic payments system standards).
The current payments system also allows non-participating Member
States to externalize costs onto participating Member States. Under mone-
tary union, Member States' NCBs can interlink large-value payment sys-
tems among NCBs and the ECB.' 8 9 This system is named (TARGET). 90
However, a number of entities with lower commitments have access to TAR-
GET. For example, the United Kingdom and Denmark are not yet partici-
pating in monetary union, yet their NCBs can still link up to TARGET and
"channel euro payments into and from the system."' 9 ' Commentators
185. See HADJIEMMANIL, supra note 17, at 41 n. 148 (stating that payment systems
and infrastructures will be maintained at the level of NCBs, rather than the ECB) and
MALAGutn, supra note 101, at 327.
186. See MALAGum, supra note 101, at 318. See also HADJIEMMANUIL., supra note 17, at
42 (noting that prior to monetary union, NCBs were cooperating on oversight of pay-
ment systems and minimum common features of payment systems).
187. See Working Group on E.U. Payment Systems, REPORT TO THE COUNCIL OF TtiE
EUROPEAN MONETARY INSTITUTE ON THE TARGET SYSTEM (TRANs-EuROPEAN AUTOMATED
REAL-TIME GROSS SEm-rLMENT ExREss TRANSFER SYSTEM), A PAYMENT SYSTEM ARRANGEMENT
FOR STAGE III OF EMU, (May 1995) (stating decentralized arrangements are to be pre-
ferred to centralization and the EU TARGET system would be used for monetary policy).
188. See MALAGuTi, supra note 101, at 334.
189. See KENEN, supra note 42, at 60 and HADJIEMMANUIL, supra note 17, at 41 n. 148
(stating that Member States have adopted a strategy based on minimum harmonization
of national systems and a common infrastructure, the TARGET system, that implements
payment arrangements based on principles of efficiency, market orientation and
decentralization).
190. See supra note 185; see also SMiTs, supra note 48, at 301.
191. SMiTs, supra note 48, at 303-04.
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argue that this could allow externalization of costs by non-participating
Member States and lead to the breakdown of the system. In particular,
because non-participating Member States' central banks and credit institu-
tions have lower reserve requirements, They can put NCBs and euro zone
credit institutions at a competitive disadvantage if they have unrestricted
access to capital markets. 192 Neverthless, the payments system may have
to absorb this externalization of costs by non-participating Member States,
because screening access to TARGET may violate "fundamental freedoms
on the common market," particularly the free flow of capital. 193
In sum, the mere existence of legal commitments does not make them
credible. The Maastricht legal arrangement permits conflicts of interest in
enforcement decisionmaking and provides weak sanctions for outside
enforcement, impeding the first type of credible commitment. Moreover,
deficiencies in payment systems, the scope of credit institutions, and credit
access allow Member States to externalize the costs of monetary expan-
sion, impairing the second type of credible commitment. Member State
commitments through the Maastricht legal arrangement consequently lack
credibility.
IV. Ajudicial Solution
Judicious use of monetary expansion by NCBs may be beneficial to pro-
mote harmonization of the Community. The benefits of wise monetary
policy are evident to U.S. citizens from the exploits of the current Fed,
under the guidance of Alan Greenspan. 194 A wise NCB monetary expan-
sion may provide a precise, area-specific tonic to a Community member
economy. 195 The costs may also be bearable. The short-term inflationary
costs of such an expansion would be distributed across the Community,
but an economic recovery ultimately would benefit the Community in the
medium to long run. The total control of money by centrist Community
personnel would dwindle occasionally, but this may not be appalling.
The judicial machinery of the Community could be used to keep
Member State monetary expansion in check. Unlike other outside enforce-
ment mechanisms and sanctions, the EC Treaty provides a substantial
192. See MEHNERT-MELAND, supra note 44, at 54.
193. SMITS, supra note 48, at 303. Smits recommends access restrictions on the NCBs
of Member States with a derogation. See id. at 303-04. The rule-of-reason test applies
(e.g. the ECJ ruling in Cassis du Dijon and Keck v. Mithouard), and Smits argues there
are objective reasons to limit the access of non-participating NCBs (required by the test)
because of a close connection between TARGET access and monetary policy. However,
the burden is on EMU banks to argue that use of the system for monetary policy pur-
poses necessitates a deviation from the fundamental freedoms of the common market.
See id. at 304.
194. See DEANE & PRINGLE, supra note 49, at 227-28 (commenting on Greenspan's use
of a hands-on supervisory role for the Fed).
195. Cf. Kai', supra note 42, at 66 (arguing that the ECB is likely to adopt a distrib-
utive model rather than a tightly centralized model (as in the United States) because a
centralized model requires (1) a large ECB funds market for commercial banking and
lending, (2) a well integrated euro-dominated security market, and (3) large holdings of
such securities by commercial banks, and these conditions do not exist).
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outside enforcement mechanism through the European Court of Justice.' 96
Currently, this outside enforcement does not create a credible commitment
against monetary expansion because the Court of Justice has not suffi-
ciently interpreted Maastricht provisions relating to European monetary
union. However, while the EC Treaty creates weak enforcement provisions
by the ECB and European Council, the European Court of Justice has juris-
diction over many issues involving monetary policy, 197 as well as jurisdic-
tion concerning the obligations of NCBs under the Treaty.198 Specifically,
the ECB can bring action against a NCB for failing to fulfill an obligation
under the Treaty.199 The ECB can also bring action to protect its "preroga-
tives." 200 But a NCB governor can be relieved of office only if the Court of
Justice finds "serious misconduct" or lack of fulfillment of conditions
required for performance of duties, based in the EC Treaty or any rule of
law, through a referral after a ECB Governing Council decision (or by the
governor himself).20 1
However, litigation over monetary expansion currently cannot be
assumed to cut against breaching Member States. A private right of action
exists for any third person whom an ECB regulation or decision directly
and individually concerns, but to whom the regulation or decision is not
addressed.202 "Any party" can bring action asserting that an ECB regula-
tion is inapplicable203 by claiming lack of competence; infringement of an
essential procedural requirement; infringement of the EC Treaty or any rule
of law relating to its application; or misuse of powers. 20 4 These claims
include an omission by the ECB infringing the EC Treaty.20 5 The Court of
Justice can review the legality of regulations and decisions by the ECB.20 6
Moreover, the Court of Justice's decision is binding on the ECB.20 7 The
196. See MEHNERT-MELAND, supra note 44, at 87-88 (outlining the role of the European
Court of Justice in European monetary Union).
197. See EC TREATY, supra note 13, arts. 173 and 175, fourth paragraph (stating the
Court of Justice has jurisdiction over all proceedings by or against the ECB that fall
within the ECB's field of competence).
198. See id. art. 180(d); MEHNERT-MELAND, supra note 44, at 50-51. See also SHAW,
supra note 96, at 245-246 (discussing the authority and effects of rulings of the Court of
Justice).
199. See EC TREATY, supra note 13, art. 180(d) (citing Article 169, which provides that
the Commission can bring reasoned opinion and also suit against a member failing to
perform).
200. Id. art. 173, third paragraph; see also SHAw, supra note 96, at 246. The Treaty
does not define these "prerogatives." See EC Treaty, supra note 13, art. 173.
201. See Ma-REaRT-MEIAuN, supra note 44, at 77-78; ESCB Statute, supra note 44, art.
14.2.
202. See EC TREATY, supra note 13, art. 173, fourth paragraph.
203. See id. art. 184; see also SmITS, supra note 48, at 347-48.
204. See EC TREATY, supra note 13, art. 173, second paragraph.
205. See id. art. 175, first paragraph.
206. See id. art. 173, second paragraph. But see MIGUEL PoInARs MADURO, WE mE
COURT: THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CONSTITTmIoN 15-
16 (1998) (arguing that the legal discourse between the Court and other institutions
depends on the bargaining power of institutions and their management of contingent
conflicts).
207. See EC TREATY, supra note 13, art. 176.
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ECB is liable for damages by its institutions or servants in the performance
of their duties.208
The Court of Justice can interpret several broadly-drafted duties under
the EC Treaty and thereby create a credible commitment through the sever-
ity of the court's external enforcement mechanism. Maastricht imposes
certain duties on Member State governments in regard to their economic
policies. A key aspect of the Treaty is the non-influence principle of Article
107, which prohibits monetary union institutions and Member States from
seeldng or taking instructions. 20 9 Numerous analyses have been made of
this provision, but at a minimum,2 10 the non-influence article incoherently
rubs against articles mandating that the ECB consult and "debate" with the
European Parliament and consult with Community institutions.2 11 The
Court of Justice would need to interpret the Treaty to eliminate this lack of
208. See id. art. 215, second and third paragraphs.
209. See id. art. 107. The non-influence principle seeks ambitiously to insulate the
ESCB from political pressure. In comparison to the legal independent-status language of
the Bundesbank, the ECB statute is considerably stricter. The Bundesbank Act, § 12,
second sentence states "in exercising the powers conferred on it by this Act, the Bank is
independent of instruction from the Federal Cabinet." In contrast, the language in Arti-
cle 107 states "neither the ECB, nor a national central bank, nor any member of their
decision making bodies shall seek or take instructions from Community institutions or
bodies, from any government of a Member State or from any other body." Id.; see also
SMrrs, supra note 48, at 172, n. 116. This applies to any and all tasks of the ESCB and
ECB, not just monetary policy functions. See Lastra, supra note 161, at 489. Theoreti-
cally, influence can occur on the ESCB and the ECB. Through politicized appointment
of the Executive Board and NCB governors, absence of prescribed long terms of office,
presence of representatives from the Council and Commission in Governing Council
meetings, accountability to European Parliament art. 109b(3), and informal and formal
contacts with national governments.
In practice, the line dividing arguments and pressure is thin. Difficulties in proving
pressure are also tremendous, requiring real evidence and systemic monitoring by the
Community. Government representatives have much more opportunity for exchange of
information and consultation in the EMU than in some Member States. Exchange of
information and consultation is envisaged between the Ecofin Council, the Commis-
sion, and the ECB. The President of the Council and a member of the Commission may
participate (but not vote) in the meetings of the Governing Council of the ECB (pursu-
ant to EC Treaty art. 109b(1)) and the General Council (pursuant to ESCB Statute art.
46.2). Heads of State or the Commission President may be present during part of the
proceedings when visiting the ECB. See SMITs, supra note 48, at 173, n.123. This con-
trasts with the Netherlands and Sweden, for example, where economic meetings do not
include the Royal Commissioner or the Crown's agent, respectively. See id. n.119-20.
According to this thesis, a Court of Justice decision is necessary to better define the
scope of Article 107.
210. However, only Community and Member State political entities are prohibited
from endeavoring to influence the ESCB. See id. at 161, n.56. Therefore, private organi-
zations and entities are not statutorily prohibited from seeking to influence the ESCB,
although the ESCB may not receive instructions.
211. Article 107 may be drafted in overly strict language. Several commentators have
argued that Article 107's prohibition on receiving instruction should not be strictly con-
strued. For example, Smits argues that the ECB's obligation (pursuant to EC Treaty art.
109b) to present its policy to the European Parliament clashes with Article 107's prohibi-
tion on receiving instructions "from any other body." See id. at 179. For instance, Arti-
cle 109b(3) provides for a "general debate" in the European Parliament on the ECB
annual report, which contains yearly projections for monetary policy. In addition to
Maastricht provisions that clash with this legal duty, such rules of statutory construc-
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clarity between consultation and influence before a Member State repre-
sentative's interaction with the ESCB could be considered improper. In
addition, Member States have a duty pursuant to Article 103(1) to coordi-
nate their economic policies according to the broad guidelines set by the
Community under Article 102a.2 12 Other duties imposed by Treaty seem
to be aspirations rather than actual duties. Member States are required to
conduct their economic policies by the principles of "an open market econ-
omy with free competition, favouring an efficient allocation of
resources,"213 and by the principles rendered in Article 2, including "sus-
tainable and non-inflationary growth respecting the environment," high
employment and social protection, increased standard of living and quality
of life, high convergence of economic performance, and economic and
social cohesion and solidarity among Member States.214 Also, Member
States must comply with the principles of Article 3a, namely, stable prices,
sound public finances and monetary conditions and a sustainable balance
of payments.2 15
Although these provisions are broadly-drafted and contain difficulties
in proof, the Court of Justice could rule that monetary expansion violates
any such legal duty. This type of ruling by the Court of Justice could put
the court's machinery behind enforcement of the Member States commit-
ment against monetary expansion. Depending on the facts of the judg-
ment, this type of enforcement may raise the costs to a Member State above
the benefits of monetary expansion. Thereby the Court of Justice could fill
the gaps in Maastricht's legal and institutional arrangement and create an
external enforcement-based credible commitment against monetary
expansion.
Conclusion
Within two months of monetary union, Member States have begun trying
to affect an expansion of the money supply to ameliorate recessions. Mem-
ber States and their politicians reap strong benefits from trying to expand
the money supply, including public benefits from public countercycical
economic policy, benefits for political self-interest, benefits to government
fiscal interests and benefits from collective action problems within the euro
zone. The legal structure of monetary union intends to commit Member
States against monetary expansion. But this commitment is not credible
because deficiencies exist in provisions relating to outside enforcement
(the first type of credible commitment) and self-enforcement (the second
tion would call into question why Maastricht contains consultative provisions, if no
influence can be exerted on ECB officials.
212. See EC TREATY, supra note 13, art. 103(2); see also HADJIEMMANUIL, supra note 17,
at 32-34.
213. EC TREATY, supra note 13, art. 102a; see also BEMaNAN Er An., supra note 69, at
1201.
214. EC TREATY, supra note 13, art. 2.
215. See id. art. 3a, as referenced by Article 102a; see also BxmlA- Er A ., supra note
69, at 1201.
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type of credible commitment). Deficiencies exist in outside enforcement
because conflicts of interest may exist among the decisionmakers for
outside enforcement, NCBs can perform functions outside the ESCB and
the sanctions for violating monetary and fiscal policy provisions are weak
or nonexistent. Deficiencies exist in self-enforcement because the legal
structure does not internalize costs by allowing credit access by govern-
ments, indeterminate costs and regulation of "credit institutions," and
defects in payment systems. As a result, without modification of the legal
arrangement, commitments against monetary expansion may not with-
stand future Member State action.
